【摘要】 本文从公司治理角度所作的研究表明，在内部治理机制亟待完善、外部审计约束相对乏力的情况下，集中持股、具有绝对信息优势的第一大股东不仅有动机也有能力粉饰甚至虚构财务报表，掩盖实际存在的问题，避开外部审计约束；而此时，其他大股东通过外部治理机制进行制衡时所面临的成本更低而成功的概率更大，因此很有可能不选择通过内部治理机制实施对第一大股东的制衡，而是更多地求助于外部治理机制，利用自身的信息优势与外部审计者合作，降低信息不对称性，配合注册会计师审计、发现控股股东的财务粉饰和造假行为，提高外部审计约束的有效性。

【关键词】 大股东制衡  大股东制衡度  信息不对称  外部审计约束

Blockholders Counterbalance, Information Asymmetry and External Auditing Constraints: Evidences from Chinese Listed companies from 2001 to 2004

　　Abstract: In this paper, from an angle of corporate governance, we find that facing with imperfect internal governance mechanisms and weak external auditing constraints, the controlling shareholders with significant information advantages have not only the motivation but also the ability to be involved in and to cover up more and more frequent financial dressing and even financial fraudulent in annual reports. And at the same time, because of the higher cost and the lower likelihood of success, other blockholders most probably give up to depend on internal governance mechanisms to counterbalance controlling shareholders but choose to fall back on external auditing constraints and to cooperate with independent auditors thus decreasing information asymmetry with their information advantages, and enhance effectiveness of external auditing constraints to find financial dressing and fraudulent in annual reports and to issue modified audit opinions.

　　Key words: Blockholder Counterbalance, Counterbalance Degree of Blockholders, Asymmetric Information, External Auditing Constraints