【摘 要】 审计意见购买是目前学术界和监管部门关心的重要课题。本文从联盟理论的框架出发分析审计意见购买行为，导出了完全合作和不合作情况下的审计意见购买的特征，并在此基础上研究了在自发情况下，道德联盟的形成和特征及其稳定的条件。研究结论表明，在完全合作情况下审计师被收买的数量要少于不合作情况下的审计师被收买的数量；且完全合作情况下审计师的福利水平要高于非合作时审计师的福利水平。但是完全合作情况下的均衡不具备稳定性，所以审计师正处于道德的困境之中。在联盟情况下，道德联盟中的审计师的福利会随着联盟的扩大而增加。同时道德环境也会随着联盟的成员的扩大而改善。更重要的是这种道德联盟是稳定的，会自我执行。

　　【关键词】 道德困境   审计意见购买    联盟

 

Ethical Dilemma and Opinion Shopping

　　Abstract：Opinion shopping has attracted extensive research in accounting. Through the coalition theory, this paper analyzes the characteristics of the opinion shopping with the full cooperation and the noncooperation, and raises the characteristics and the stability condition of the ethical coalition. The results show that the gains coming from full-cooperation is greater than noncooperation, but the opinion shopping by the full cooperation are smaller than noncooperation. Nevertheless, the optimality of full-cooperation is not a stable coalition. Under the ethical coalition, however, the opinion shopping by Coalition auditors is on the decrease with the size of the coalition, but the gains of Coalition auditors is increase. Moreover the coalition is stable and self enforcing.

　　Key words：ethical dilemma, opinion shopping, coalition